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Summary: 
 Recent UK legislation facilitating the credit scoring of SMEs using Big Data 
techniques and Open Data sources threatens to further hollow out information 
management norms and data subject rights enshrined in privacy and data protection 
law just as it is gathering unprecedented momentum in courts and on statute books 
across the EU. 
 After examining the economic rationale for such measures and their envisaged impact 
on the credit risk industry, we argue that the associated regulatory re-shuffling and 
privacy-related safeguards are highly unlikely to address adequately the serious 
accuracy, transparency and accountability concerns of individual data subjects. 
 Would the effective, full enforcement of data protection principles and data subject 
rights really cripple the credit reference industry to the detriment of the nascent 
economic recovery, or is there a middle path and will the forthcoming EU General 
Data Protection Regulation provide it? 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
With the greatest depth of available credit information in the world, the UK is leading the EU 
in developing a sector where it lags behind the US: alternative financing for small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Post-financial crisis economic rationales prioritising 
growth and higher-quality lending are fuelling ongoing UK reforms to enable wider sharing 
of privately-gathered financial behaviour data and the controlled release of publicly-gathered 
information to business information providers such as credit reference agencies (CRAs) in 
order to foster the development and spread of innovative, increasingly-accurate methods of 
credit risk analysis. This recourse to Big Data techniques and Open Data sources is expected 
to meet the stated economic policy goals, but in so doing it threatens to hollow out further 
information management norms and data subject rights enshrined in privacy and data 
protection law just as it is gathering unprecedented momentum in courts and on statute books 
across the continent. 
Since the vast majority of UK SMEs are small entities, the scoring of them spans both 
commercial and consumer credit streams, meaning that personal data is at stake on a far 
greater scale than with larger firms. Here we question how the movement toward accessing 
ever-more-granular and complete data on SMEs for credit scoring purposes can be reconciled 
with the putative obligations of data controllers and rights of data subjects. Would the 
effective, full enforcement of data protection principles (the need for data subject consent, or 
legitimate interests as a legal basis for processing) and data subject rights (to data portability; 
to object to processing; to “be forgotten”; to access one’s data and the logic underpinning 
one’s score) really cripple the credit reference industry to the detriment of the nascent 
economic recovery, or is there a middle path? 
Having examined the policy drive toward Big and Open Data-enhanced credit scoring of 
SMEs, we maintain that the associated regulatory re-shuffling and privacy-related safeguards 
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are highly unlikely to address adequately the serious accuracy, transparency and 
accountability concerns of individual data subjects. Moreover, the more robust enforcement 
mechanisms in the forthcoming EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) indicate that 
from 2018 non-compliance with its terms will be a non-trivial matter for organisations. With 
the concrete impact of those provisions yet to be seen, however, we challenge the continued 
reliance on data subject consent in the credit scoring context save as a tool for encouraging 
more transparent processing and, in this connection and taking due account of trade secrecy, 
emphasise the need for tighter regulation of automated decision-making and the processing of 
sensitive data in the context of the credit risk industry. 
 
II. LENDING TO SMES IN THE UK  
a. The SME Lending Market 
i. In the UK 
Of the record 5.4 million private sector businesses in existence in the UK at the start of 2015, 
SMEs
1
 accounted for 99.9% of that total,
2
 employed 60% of the private sector workforce, and 
posted a combined turnover of 47% of private sector turnover nationwide. A total of 4.1 
million of the 5.4 million private sector businesses (76%) were non-employing sole traders. 
Taking a longer view, 90% of the 1.9 million increase in the number of businesses since 2000 
has been due to non-employing businesses.
3
  
Whereas these striking figures alone hint at the centrality of SMEs to the UK economy, 
access to finance for such enterprises has been significantly limited. Bank of England figures 
show a sustained decline in the provision of credit to private non-financial corporations 
(“PNFCs”) since the onset of the financial crisis
4
 due to a variety of interrelated factors 
resulting in asymmetric information between potential finance providers and small businesses 
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in particular.
5
 In the case of SMEs, a lack of publicly-available information on those 
businesses’ activities
6
 and the information monopolies exercised by incumbent banks 
exacerbate the problem. Past financial performance is, of course, imperative to the accurate 
assessment of creditworthiness, but that information is held by the bank with which the 
business has its current account and is not widely shared.
7
 Thus where SMEs are able to 
obtain credit, it is most likely to be from their own bank since they are inhibited from 
“shopping around” for credit on better terms, whether from another bank or alternative 
finance providers.
8
  
This stasis is reflected in and perpetuated by the fact that the SME banking sector in the UK 
continues to be dominated by four major banking groups, who together enjoy a market share 
of 85 per cent.
9
 These dominant market actors have an informational edge both as regards 
knowledge of individual businesses’ activities and the ability to compare any SME debtor to 
the sizable group of SMEs using their credit services. The problem is most acute for smaller 
SMEs which (in contrast to larger, corporate SMEs) do not file accounts, meaning that 
incumbent banks have exclusive access to the data gleaned through SMEs’ current accounts. 
The richer picture of smaller SMEs’ financial health which is available to those banks allows 
them to calculate credit risk more precisely and offer more accurately-tailored (and 
profitable) loans than outside lenders deprived of such data. 
The most immediate outcome of inhibited SME lending is an untapped pool of potentially 
productive businesses starved of the credit they need – on the terms they need – in order to 
grow. Moreover, since a key aspect of track record is (or would be) performance in 
repayment of existing credit facilities, an intractable structural problem emerges: SMEs (and 
especially start-ups) are less able than other entities to build an advantageous track record 
which would qualify them as reliable debtors. 
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ii. Throughout the EU 
The comparatively low data visibility of SMEs is also seen as a key policy challenge at EU 
level, where facilitating access to finance for SMEs is an important part of the Commission’s 
efforts to “put the EU back on the path of smart and sustainable growth”.
10
 In Europe, unlike 
the USA or Asia,
11
 scant public information about the creditworthiness of SMEs is one 
reason why those firms must rely heavily on bank financing, whereas banks’ loans to non-
financial corporates
12
 represent less than half of total assets.
13
 This asymmetric relationship 
between non-financial corporates and the financial sector combined with the post-2008 crash 
to strangle credit, particularly in those countries hit hardest by the crisis and especially for 
SMEs.
14
  
In 2011, the Commission unveiled a raft of measures aiming to improve access to finance for 
SMEs across the EU through inter alia regulatory reform, financial programmes and 
facilitation initiatives.
15
 In 2013, a study by its Internal Market and Services Directorate 
General estimated that 25% of European SMEs have no credit score, mainly due to 
insufficient and inappropriate data.
16
 It also concluded that the comparatively scarce 
information on SMEs in the EU compared to that available on SMEs in the US, where 
alternative finance options are consequently greater than in the EU, was due not only to 
deficient regulation but also to a stronger general resistance to openness in business cultures 
across EU Member States.
17
 Therefore, the Commission also voiced support for efforts to 
encourage European companies to disclose more about their financial status.
18
 Furthermore, 
in consultation, business information and scoring providers highlighted legislative and 
cultural differences between Member States as barriers to cross-border expansion and intra-
Union integration: notably, divergences in methodology and data requirements, sufficient 
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levels of publicly-available data, bankruptcy laws and privacy and data protection regimes, 
and the lack of a European database for defaults or uniform technical standards.
19
  The 
consensus was that all of these differences reduce the comparability, and therefore utility, of 
credit ratings and scores, to the detriment of the credit risk industry and the SMEs monitored 
by it.  
The Commission’s response was to order a mapping of the EU and national legislation and 
practices affecting the availability of SME credit information, “with a view to considering 
possible EU approaches to the credit scoring industry and assessing the feasibility of 
harmonising/increasing the comparability of SME data across the EU”.
20
 In April 2015 the 
collated responses of business information and scoring firms from 26 of the 28 Member 
States showed significant discrepancies in depth and type of data coverage.
21
 Although good 
coverage in basic company data and company activity was reported across the board and data 
on annual accounts are available in almost all Member States, the availability of loan-level 
data and payments history differs greatly from country to country.
22
 The policy direction is 
toward a “minimum set of common, comparable data that is equally accessible by all 
interested parties” capable of “widening the investor base for SMEs, increasing competition 
and fostering the efficiency and integration of SME funding markets”.
23
  Whilst the 
Commission proposed existing variables from the ECB as a starting point for standardised 
EU-wide credit reports, it also presented the UK as a case of “best practice in credit 
information data” and applauded the initiatives on increasing SME data sharing, the 
possibility of establishing a central credit register, and the use of non-financial VAT 
registration data in trade credit scoring,
24
 suggesting that UK policy and practice may be set 
to make a pioneering impact on this segment of the credit industry in Europe. Before 
critically assessing the potential impact of these developments on privacy and data protection, 
it is thus to the substance of recent and ongoing domestic reform that we now turn. 
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b. National Developments Stimulating Competition and Innovation 
Deeming the anti-competitive effects of the major UK banking groups’ vice-like grip on 
lending to SMEs to be “bad for consumers and business”,
25
 the UK government’s 2013 
Budget undertook to “investigate options for improving access to SME credit data to make it 
easier for newer lenders to assess loans to smaller businesses”.
26
 In December 2013 an HM 
Treasury consultation
27
 examined options for opening up access to credit data on SME 
borrowers with the aim of increasing both the reliability of credit scores obtained from the 
CRAs and the information available to challenger banks and alternative finance providers to 
allow them to reach their own informed decisions about an SME’s creditworthiness.
28
  
 
i. Sharing Big Data 
The Treasury noted that informational asymmetry is caused by various features of the current 
credit data landscape.
29
 Any finance provider with a contractual relationship with a CRA may 
purchase not only risk scores from the CRA but also underlying data on the business 
(turnover, region, sector), owner or director data (such as credit history) and default history.
30
 
The finance provider can then make its own risk assessment of the credit applicant 
incorporating that data. Important data – including positive payment performance data and 
indications of total debt exposure levels – is, however, not always shared by incumbent banks 
with CRAs. As such, even were a smaller challenger bank or alternative finance provider to 
possess the financial means to buy competitive risk scores or underlying data from the CRAs 
it would struggle to bridge the informational gap, since the providing CRAs’ products and 
services are inherently hamstrung by incumbent banks’ unwillingness to share crucial data 
with them. 
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Where (consumer and commercial) credit data are shared through CRAs, the process is 
governed not by law but by the Information Sharing Principles of Reciprocity drawn up by 
the Steering Committee on Reciprocity (“SCOR”).
31
 The Committee is a cross-industry 
forum which operates on behalf of credit industry trade association, credit industry body and 
CRA members to develop and administer the Principles.
32
 The anchoring provision, Principle 
3, states that “[d]ata will be shared on the principle that subscribers receive the same credit 
performance level data that they contribute, and should contribute all such data available”.
33
 
Here, reciprocity is strictly construed: if a newer lender offers loans to SMEs but not business 
current accounts,
34
 although it may well be able to share credit data on its loan book it will 
not be granted access to a commensurate level of detail about other products such as current 
accounts, which are only available through a closed user group.
35
 
The Treasury consultation therefore asked major banks, challenger banks, alternative finance 
providers, CRAs, business groups, trade associations and other interested parties for their 
views on the detailed workings of the more open proposed scheme. This covered inter alia 
which banks should be required to share data, with which CRAs data should be shared and 
how frequently, and which entities should have access to the data. The government’s 
responses to the views collated were subsequently enshrined in the Small Business, 
Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 (hereinafter “the 2015 Act”) which received Royal 
Assent on 26
th
 March 2015. Regulations implementing those parts of the Act relating to SME 
credit information (hereinafter “SME Credit Data Regulations” or “the 2015 Regulations”) 
entered into force on 1
st
 January 2016.
36
 December 2014 saw confirmation of the banks to be 
initially designated to transfer the relevant data to the CRAs,
37
 whilst on the CRA side HM 
Treasury entrusted the British Business Bank (“BBB”) with inviting applications to be 
designated as participants in the scheme.
38
 In November 2015 the Treasury announced 
Experian, Equifax and CreditSafe as the first CRAs so designated.
39
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The most relevant aspects for instant purposes are twofold: precisely what data are proposed 
to be shared and what safeguards are deemed necessary for SME data subjects? Taking the 
data first, the 2015 Act and forthcoming Regulations impose two duties: a duty on designated 
banks to provide information about their SME customers to designated CRAs, and a duty on 
designated CRAs to provide information about SMEs to finance providers.
40
 The duties cover 
key indicators of current account performance data and wider credit data on SMEs’ loan and 
credit card facilities. The sharing of this second category of data is already better established 
than that of current account data, but the government deemed that since such sharing is at 
present inconsistent (as noted above, less “positive” data on payments made is in general 
shared than “negative” data on payments missed) its distribution ought to be standardised 
across the board.
41
 
The precise data to be shared cover loans, credit card accounts and current accounts. Across 
all three types of facilities this includes relevant dates and periods (start date; 
close/repayment/default date; repayment period) and other factors gauging indebtedness (for 
instance, amount outstanding; outstanding balance). Certain other data on loan and credit card 
facilities do tend toward “financial behaviour” (missed payments, cash advances, and 
defaults), but current account performance data is more revelatory in this regard: current, 
minimum, maximum and average balance; overdraft limit; total paid in and out; number of 
days in a month where the customer has exceeded its approved limit: and “bounced” cheques 
or direct debits. 
These are the data which were thus deemed crucial to measuring SMEs’ financial health. In 
fact, even more detailed data sharing had been under consideration: that of turnover data 
showing payments in and out of an SME’s account, as are of course already visible to 
incumbent banks.
42
 Responses were mixed on this question. Whereas the major banks were 
against the proposal (unsurprisingly, given that it would further compromise their 
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informational advantage) and CRAs unconvinced on practical grounds, some challenger 
banks and alternative finance providers were in favour, emphasising that the more granular 
the data, the more use it would be for assessing credit risk.
43
 Whilst only the business group 
respondents noted that the sharing of such detailed turnover data could raise privacy concerns 
for data subjects,
44
 the Treasury did echo these misgivings in explaining its decision not to 
mandate it at this stage. 
 
ii. Releasing Open Data 
Elsewhere in the 2015 Act, s.8 provides that the Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue 
and Customs (“HMRC”) may disclose non-financial VAT registration data for the purposes 
of assessing creditworthiness, compliance with financial regulations, or risk of fraud. This 
mechanism of controlled release of VAT registration data was inserted into the Act having 
featured in a separate consultation procedure led by HMRC on the sharing and publishing of 
selected tax data for public benefit,
45
 aligned with its own
46
 and the government’s broader 
policy on Open Data.
47
 The status quo can be summarised as a patchy public record for 
smaller businesses: HMRC noted around 800,000 businesses which were VAT-registered but 
not incorporated as companies
48
 amongst a total of 1.9 million live registrations, providing a 
comprehensive picture of UK businesses above the turnover threshold for mandatory 
registration (a relatively low £79,000) as well as those below the threshold which have opted 
to register voluntarily.
49
  
The consultation therefore sought to appraise the potential benefits of making VAT 
registration data on SMEs more widely available through two alternative schemes: the 
general publication as Open Data of comprehensive yet limited data sets
50
 and the controlled 
release to specific parties for limited uses of the full data sets.
51
 The range of potential 
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economic benefits flowing from the first scheme identified by HMRC was broad;
52
 moreover, 
the consultation reiterated the Shakespeare Review’s emphasis, in keeping with the 
aspirational ethos of the Open Data movement, that information disclosure can generate 
benefits in unforeseen ways.
53
 Similarly, although the principal intended benefit of the 
controlled release scheme was improved credit scoring,
54
 anti-fraud checking was also 
envisioned from the outset and a majority of respondents to the HMRC consultation argued 
that data should be released to any qualified party (for example within government, to banks 
or other credit or business information providers) provided that the parameters of permissible 
uses are defined clearly and enshrined in contract.
55
 
This flexibility is reflected in the provisions of the 2015 Act which limit controlled release to 
the assessment of creditworthiness, compliance with financial regulations, and risk of fraud. 
The policy is, nonetheless, most advanced in relation to credit scoring: the results of a joint 
research project commissioned under the consultation and carried out by HMRC in 
conjunction with three CRAs into the impact of the use of such data on trade credit scoring 
were released in June 2014, and are discussed below.
56
 
 
c. Added Value to Credit Risk Analysis 
Mandating both the wider sharing of SME credit data and the controlled release of VAT 
registration is premised on two convictions: first, the more reliable data available, the more 
accurate credit scoring will become, and second, the wider the distribution of such data (and 
its analytical fruits) the more competitive the lending market will become. In the Treasury 
consultation process on the sharing of SME credit data, this second factor was accorded 
particular weight since the business current account data which are central to the plans are 
already available to incumbent banks, and as such wider sharing thereof would recalibrate 
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access across the lending field rather than break open a hitherto-untouched information silo.
57
 
This last point is less true in respect of non-financial VAT registration data held on HMRC 
databases. Although some key elements are already deliberately placed in the public domain 
– for example, in business directories or on invoices – it is rather the systematic access to full 
datasets which is anticipated to boost significantly the coverage and accuracy of scoring.
58
 
The consensus of respondents to the HMRC consultation on the release of VAT registration 
data was that the absence of reliable information, rather than the presence of any negative 
indicators of business viability, is a key factor in lowering credit scores. One response stated 
that credit scores for unincorporated businesses could be an average of 40% lower owing to 
paucity of data.
59
 In order to test this type of hypothesis, HMRC launched a research project 
on the use of non-financial VAT registration data in trade credit scoring in conjunction with 
three CRAs. A representative sample of traders from the VAT register was scored by each 
participating CRA with and without and VAT registration data in the scoring algorithm, and 
trade credit limits of traders compared.
60
  
Through the project, 80% of the traders featured in the VAT registration data set were either 
matched to existing CRA records or identified for the very first time.
61
 Whereas all of the 
incorporated businesses identified or matched were already known to the CRAs, 55% of the 
non-incorporated traders had no previous record.
62
 This discrepancy is reflected in the 
respective shares of the 4% increase in average net trade limits across the entire sample: 
approximately three quarters was due to creation of new credit limit reports for non-
incorporated traders not previously given a limit, and around a quarter was due to an increase 
in existing trade limits.
63
 The new trade credit limits thereby attributed to the former group 
would have accounted for a 120% increase in total credit limits of non-incorporated traders 
matched or newly-identified due to VAT registration data.
64
 As such, the most likely 
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beneficiaries would be businesses which because of their newness, small size or activities, 
did not have an existing “credit footprint”,
65
 in practice chiefly sole traders or partnerships.
66
  
 
i. Credit reference agencies 
In the UK there are six private CRAs, multiple resellers and other smaller market players, 
some specialising in commercial and others in consumer credit risk analysis.
67
 CRAs collect a 
wide range of financial and non-financial data from a variety of sources to support credit 
approval.
68
 This support may come in the form of either specific information or aggregate 
risk scores, classically to lenders, who seek to determine prospective borrowers’ 
creditworthiness but lack data about the latter’s past and/or present relationships with other 
lenders and/or businesses.
69
 With the development of the business information industry, 
tailored products are now available to customers of all sizes and activities, from banks which 
integrate data into their own processes and scorecards used for loan and other business 
finance applications to small companies assessing new customers before deciding to trade.
70
 
Depending on the customer’s needs, and as explained in more detail below, information 
available for purchase includes, for example, business data (such as turnover, region, sector), 
owner/director data (such as personal credit history), default history, payments made and 
missed, county court judgments in relation to unpaid debts and insolvency proceedings.
71
 
This underlying data is incorporated into aggregate risk scores showing the business’s likely 
propensity to make or miss repayments, which are also available for purchase. Most credit 
scoring systems specifically assess the probability of business failure in the short term, using 
regression analysis, current data and macro data such as interest rates and GDP in order 
accurately to gauge where an organisation sits within its trade sector and the total business 
population.
72
 Typically, CRAs’ customers use an on-line service to obtain a credit report on 
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an existing or potential customer which is generated in real time along with credit scores, 
credit limits and/or recommendations.
73
 Services offered by CRAs can be tailored, rolled into 
one, and/or continuous: for example, some (mainly larger and more sophisticated) companies 
use a portfolio analysis and monitoring service whereby all customers can be analysed or and 
tracked.
74
 
 
ii. New data and wider access in context 
In developing such services CRAs analyse a wide variety of identifying, financial, 
behavioural, collateral valuation and contextual information on both individuals and 
companies, from a number of public and proprietary sources, and are constantly identifying 
new sources of information with the aim of improving the accuracy and depth of information 
in their databases.
75
 The added value to CRAs of SME credit data shared via the 2015 Act is 
essentially that it enriches their records on those smaller entities. In turn, banks and other 
finance providers often rely on information from CRAs in considering borrowing requests by 
SMEs, but it can be difficult to match CRA data where these businesses are unincorporated or 
recently incorporated.
76
 This, as the HMRC/BIS joint research project attests, is the particular 
added value of non-financial VAT registration data: to help business information providers 
such as CRAs verify identity and status more accurately, and make more reliable judgments 
about a business and its proprietors, location, activities and age.
77
 
There is much similarity between the information that is available on individuals and 
businesses, especially toward the smaller end of the business spectrum where the limited 
information available on those business entities is often supplemented with information on 
the personal credit histories of key people within the business.
78
 Indeed, sole traders 
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especially are often reliant upon financing obtained on the basis of personal credit assessment 
and personally-owned assets, such as personal loans or credit cards.
79
  
One service provided by CRAs is the often complex and costly matching of data on 
individuals and companies from a wide range of sources, in other words establishing that a 
person or firm identified from one source is the same as a person or firm identified from 
another source. This is a more complex process in the case of SMEs than for individuals 
since the former may be founded and dissolved easily, have multiple directors and have 
ownership and subsidiary relationships with other firms.  In other words, matching is 
inherently difficult – and therefore useful – when it comes to young firms or start-ups, where 
the dearth of comprehensive information is widely accepted to lead to credit-constraint.
80
 
The wealth of information gathered, monitored and analysed by CRAs can be divided into 
identifying information, financial information, behavioural information and contextual 
information. Identifying information on both businesses and individuals comes from various 
sources including the Electoral Roll – and now, with the 2015 Act, the VAT Register. As 
mentioned, the creation of a comprehensive business register has also been proposed and 
remains a live option.
81
 In the case of companies, CRAs will also layer on directory and 
social media information to verify that a company exists and to build a profile for it,
82
 its 
ownership (group), and its directors – whether they have other directorships or have been 
connected with failed businesses.
83
   
Financial information covers financial accounts where filed with Companies House 
(businesses only) and credit account data (both businesses and individuals, and which may 
also be considered behavioural data). Filed accounts are used to gauge companies’ size and 
strength: for large companies, full accounts (balance sheet, profit and loss account, cash flow 
statement and notes to the accounts) are available, whereas for smaller companies, which file 
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only an abbreviated balance sheet, it is necessary to use complex models based on industry 
sector, assets and employee numbers if this is known in order to measure business size.
84
 
Credit account data includes type of account, repayment amount and term, amount 
outstanding, history of payment, default balance and so on as detailed above in the analysis of 
the changes wrought by the 2015 Act; similar data is extracted from current accounts or loan 
facilities used by individuals or businesses.  
Much of this information can also be classed as behavioural information alongside payment 
accounts data (sourced for example from trade credit, trade credit insurers, utility providers 
and telecommunication companies) since its weight or insight value is derived from context. 
For instance, a sudden switch in behaviour from timely to late payment may be cause for 
further investigation, although not necessarily an indicator of heightened credit risk.
85
 
Payment accounts data is reportedly often the most predictive information available, 
especially trade payment data.
86
 One convincing reason for this is that, on the whole, 
borrowers are more likely to stop paying utility bills or supplier invoices before they stop 
making payments on credit products.
87
  
Trade credit is essentially business-to-business credit taking the form of delayed payment, 
with payment made when income from the projects has been realised or when final delivery 
of the goods has been made.
88
 Trade credit is an important source of finance for businesses of 
all sizes, but is particularly important for start-ups and small firms
89
 - especially in the 
absence of conventional credit, making the UK somewhat unique in the EU.
90
 Since trade 
credit data (within the category of payment accounts data) is available through CRAs to all of 
their clients, whether in the form of credit scores or the underlying data, the Treasury saw no 
need to mandate sharing thereof in the 2015 Act.
91
 Trade creditors themselves often rely on 
CRAs’ judgments in the form of credit scores and recommended limits; the anticipated 
increase in such limits due to the VAT registration datasets newly-available to CRAs was 
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detailed above. There remained, however, the question of whether (non-financial) trade 
creditors ought to be given access to data on (financial) loan facilities, credit, or business 
accounts which is currently governed by reciprocity. Notably, the Bank of England supported 
such access – at least to the credit scores based on credit account data – on the grounds of 
supporting both trade and the provision of trade credit.
92
 Accordingly, the 2015 Act has 
defined “alternative finance providers”, beneficiaries of its data-sharing scheme alongside 
lenders, so as to encompass trade creditors.
93
 
Returning to behavioural information processed by CRAs, further examples available on both 
individuals and businesses are any county court judgments (CCJs), court orders or decrees 
issued (sourced from the Registry Trust) and bankruptcies and insolvencies (through the 
Insolvency Service). It is worth recalling here that a central source of concern in the context 
of inhibited lending to SMEs is precisely that this “negative” data tends to be the only 
publicly-available data available on sole traders or partnerships.
94
 By way of contrast, either 
individually or in combination the following publicly-visible events may affect a limited 
company’s credit score: late filing of accounts at Companies House; resignation of 
director(s); change of ownership; change of auditors; change of registered office; sudden high 
volume of credit enquiries.
95
  
Collateral valuation is also important to the risk assessment of prospective secured lending to 
SMEs: depending on the circumstances mortgages and charges may have the effect of 
lowering a credit score,
96
 but over-collateralisation can alleviate the necessity to use other 
information items to fully assess default risk.
97
 Finally, valuable contextual information in 
theory covers any data that can be used to interpret all other data items in forming a 
judgmental assessment of the SME’s expected performance, often against a subset of firms 
that can be expected to perform similarly.
98
 Besides confirming baseline factors such as 
length of time in business (for SMEs, discoverable for example through VAT Registration 
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data) common examples of useful context include the industry and location
99
 in which the 
firm operates, the competitive position it has, the customers it has and the creditworthiness of 
its customers. Social media data can be very useful in this regard: for example, websites can 
be searched for information such as whether the firm is winning contracts.
100
  
Especially with smaller SMEs, there is substantial crossover with consumer credit risk 
analysis: this is an entirely logical step for assessing (and demonstrating) creditworthiness of, 
for example, a start-up with no credit track record of its own and minimal assets. Such 
consumer scoring, which has much in common with Big Data-enhanced marketing 
techniques, is most sophisticated in the US, with the recent emergence of a wave of credit 
risk analysis start-ups for whom “all data is credit data”.
101
 However, ongoing projects in the 
UK now appear to be following suit insofar as they eschew the constraints of traditional 
“track record” credit analysis in favour of more holistic and dynamic monitoring, such as a 
tailored appreciation of an SME’s place within its “business ecosystem”.
102
  
In particular the extent of technological crossover with marketing techniques has prompted 
US commentators to voice major concerns as to inter alia the discrepancy in impact caused 
by inaccuracies in marketing (for example, unsolicited advertising) and access to credit 
(which may greatly impact on life chances), the propensity of such technologies to conceal 
and entrench discriminatory treatment, and the use of “alternative credit scoring” products 
specifically to target vulnerable individuals for predatory loan terms.
103
 Of these three central 
concerns, the first two shall be addressed later from a UK perspective in light of the 
forthcoming General Data Protection Regulation as well as the SME credit data reforms. For 
now, in the context of encouraging the development of “alternative credit scoring” products it 
is worth recalling that the Treasury decided against mandating the sharing of granular 
turnover data with “designated” CRAs. This data, showing payments in and out of business 
accounts, is undoubtedly of great putative value to credit risk analysis yet as noted above, the 
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Treasury declined to order the sharing thereof ostensibly due to privacy-related as well as 
practical issues. It ought to be underlined that incumbent banks already have access to this 
data as operators of business current accounts; as such, this decision might have gone some 
way to appease their resistance to seeing their informational advantage diminished by the 
reforms. Notably, however, the possibility of mandating such sharing in future was not 
removed from the table. If it is to materialise, it is submitted that this must not be done before 
critical concerns as to the transparency and accountability of credit risk analysis using Big 
and Open Data are adequately addressed.  
 
III. CRAs AND DATA PROTECTION LAW 
a. Legal and Regulatory Framework 
i. General provisions 
In contrast to the commercial credit sector, which is largely unregulated, the Consumer Credit 
Act 1974 (CCA) established a licensing scheme for consumer credit businesses, consumer 
hire businesses and ancillary credit businesses, with the latter term encompassing CRAs,
104
 
and set out a framework for the overall regulation of the supply of consumer credit 
(influenced) by those entities. The rules therein, developed through a body of secondary 
legislation, elaborated upon and enforced thereafter by the Office of Fair Trading, have since 
been amended most notably by the Consumer Credit Act 2006 and secondary legislation 
implementing the EC Consumer Credit Directives. The overarching goal of the 2006 Act, 
itself a major enactment updating the ageing statute at 71 sections and four schedules, was to 
encourage responsible lending.
105
 To that end it inter alia provided for the regulation of all 
consumer credit and consumer hire agreements subject to certain exemptions; made further 
provision on the supply of post-contract information, default, and unfair relationships; 
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enhanced the functions and powers of the OFT, deemed ineffectual, in relation to licensing; 
enabled debtors to challenge unfair relationships with creditors; and provided for an 
Ombudsman scheme to hear complaints in relation to businesses licensed under the Act.
106
  
Subsequently, regulation of the entire consumer credit market passed from the Office of Fair 
Trading (OFT), which was dissolved, to the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA, created 1
st
 
April 2013) by virtue of powers included in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 
(FSMA) and the Financial Services Act 2012.
107
 Since April 2014, activities relating to 
consumer credit have been regulated by the FCA through a combination of provisions 
retained under the 1974 Act, new provisions in FSMA and FCA conduct rules which have the 
force of law and which in turn incorporate in places pre-existing regulation from the OFT. 
The coalition government believed that the transfer of regulation from that (not-for-profit) 
government department to the FCA (which is independent of government and financed by 
fees charged to members of the financial services industry) would result in “tougher, more 
proactive” and more flexible protection of consumers at a time of high levels of unsecured 
lending, exponential growth in the provision of credit services online, and much-publicised 
concerns surrounding predatory payday lending and high-cost credit.
108
 
As regards the credit reference industry, besides establishing a licencing system the 1974 Act 
originally provided that a creditor, owner or negotiator must upon the request of a debtor or 
hirer disclose the name and address of any CRA consulted. It also created a duty on CRAs to 
provide individuals with a copy of their credit file in return for a small fee and a mechanism 
for the correction of wrong information in that file.
109
 Amendments made principally by data 
protection legislation, the 2006 Act and through secondary consumer credit legislation 
implementing the EC Consumer Credit Directives have: obliged creditors to automatically 
inform refused credit applicants of their having used a CRA in coming to their decision not to 
proceed with the agreement and to provide the applicant with the particulars of the CRA(s) 
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consulted; introduced exceptions to such an obligation where, for example, disclosure would 
contravene the Data Protection Act 1998 or (be likely to) prejudice the administration of 
justice; provided that CRAs must, in issuing credit files to individuals having made such a 
request,
110
 also inform those individuals of their additional right to have any wrong 
information corrected; and modified the 1974 “notice” system (of removal, amendment, or of 
no action taken) to allow for the adjudication of ICO in disputed cases and, concerning 
“business consumers” only, the intervention of the OFT (now FCA) to filter out any aspects 
of the credit file the publication of which would “adversely affect the service provided to its 
customers by the agency”.
111
 
Since the transfer of regulation of the industry to the FCA in 2014, this legislative framework 
is fleshed out by the aforementioned conduct rules (the Consumer Credit Sourcebook or 
“CONC” Rules) found within the general FCA Handbook.
112
 CONC 9 was until recently the 
(very short) section of most relevance to CRAs from a data protection perspective: CONC 9.2 
R clarified the extent of the duty on CRAs to forward details of corrected entries in credit 
files (removed or amended entries; other information based in whole or in part on any such 
entry) not to the objector but to “each person to whom at any time since the relevant date it 
has furnished information relevant to the financial standing of the individual concerned”
113
 – 
essentially prospective lenders.  
In late 2015, however, CONC 9 was deleted following an FCA consultation with 
representatives of the credit industry, thereby passing the burden of informing such persons 
of the altered information in a user’s credit file to that user. The FCA stated that “[i]t is open 
to the consumer to bring the amended information to the attention of persons whose decisions 
might be materially affected” and that “[t]here is no requirement generally under data 
protection legislation to notify previous recipients of incorrect data, unless ordered by a 
court”.
114
 Although this development certainly appears regrettable in principle from the 
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perspective of the data subject, its significance ought to be qualified. The burden at stake is 
certainly of secondary importance to the proper functioning of the data accuracy, access, 
correction and erasure mechanisms in the first place; so long as adequate guidance is in place 
from the lender as to which CRAs ought to be notified, completing the correction ought to be 
a relatively straightforward affair. Although no further details are available,
115
 it seems 
reasonable to presume that the credit industry view on CONC 9.2 R was along these lines.  
Nonetheless, and even with due account taken of the minor nature of such an adjustment, it is 
difficult to reconcile fully the burden shift with the spirit of the upcoming EU GDPR which 
seeks to empower data subjects across the board. Finally, it is worth noting the FCA’s 
reference to the importance of the user’s own initiative and reliance on the statutory 
possibility of court proceedings. As indicated below, court action is a remote prospect for the 
average data subject – certainly as regards credit scoring. As such, it is possible to interpret 
the rationale behind such a rule change as indicative of a laissez-faire approach to 
enforcement of compliance with the cognate data protection norms included in the 2015 
reforms. We return to the FCA’s newfound, as-yet-undefined role in the enforcement of 
select data protection provisions vis-à-vis SME data subjects below.  
 
ii. Data protection  
It can be seen from the (different) definitions of personal data in both the 1995 Data 
Protection Directive (DPD)
116
 and the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA)117 that the provisions 
are only applicable to data which relate to a living individual. As such, the legislation endows 
only natural persons with rights. Setting aside momentarily the significant grey areas 
surrounding the concept of personal data, it is worth recalling that CRAs produce credit 
reports on both businesses and individuals, and therefore on both legal and natural persons. 
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As noted above, currently 76% of SMEs in the UK are sole traders. Importantly, whereas sole 
traders (along with partnerships) may be classed as “businesses” for the purposes of 
information sharing in the credit industry,
118
 from a data protection perspective what is 
important is whether the processing of personal data as defined under European and UK 
legislation is carried out – regardless of the formal status of the credit applicant. 
It is easy to accept that lending decisions relating to business credit applicants – especially in 
the case of large organisations – are less likely to involve personal data.
119
 Conversely, the 
smaller the business entity, the more probable it is that data gathered on its economic activity 
will qualify as personal data. This was the reasoning underpinning the decision to treat sole 
traders, partnerships of three or fewer and unincorporated bodies as “consumers” for the 
purposes of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 and the Data Protection Act 1998.
120
 This has 
consequences for the rights enshrined therein to take legal action in respect of breaches of the 
data protection principles and the specific provisions in the CCA. Under the DPA, individuals 
are entitled to apply to the relevant court
121
 for compensation for damage sustained or distress 
suffered as a result of any contravention by a data controller of the requirements of the 1998 
Act.
122
 Individuals may also apply for a court order to ensure rectification, blocking, erasure 
or destruction of inaccurate data.
123
 When an individual exercises the gateway right of access 
to their personal data in s.7 of the DPA and the data controller is a credit reference agency, 
the latter must also inform the data subject of their rights under the DPA (the legal action just 
detailed) and under s.159 CCA, which provides a right of referral to the OFT (where the 
objector is a partnership or other unincorporated body of persons) or to ICO (in any other 
case) where either party remains unsatisfied.
124
 These mechanisms exist in parallel with the 
Commissioner’s other enforcement powers relating to the private sector: the issuing of a 
variety of notices enabling it to determine whether provisions of the DPA have been or are 
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being contravened, request remedial measures, levy monetary penalties, and ultimately 
pursue criminal prosecution.   
The impact of the described system on CRAs is discussed in the following section. First, 
however, it must be noted that guidelines for best practice in honouring the data protection 
principles have also come at cross-industry level. Firstly, the SCOR principles mentioned 
above entail contractual commitments for the regular monitoring and certification of their 
own compliance with the Principles of Reciprocity, and the quality, completeness and 
accuracy of data supplied, overlapping with key data protection principles. Furthermore, in 
2000, under the aegis of the Office of Fair Trading, an updated guide to consumer credit 
scoring
125
 was drawn up by credit industry organisations (such as the British Bankers 
Association and the Consumer Credit Trade Association) together with the CRAs operational 
at that time and in consultation with the then-Office of the Data Protection Registrar. A new 
industry standard was required in order to reflect significant advances in the use of scoring in 
credit assessment since the release of the last guide in 1993 and to ensure compliance with 
recently-introduced legislation, chiefly the EC Data Protection Directive. Provisions of the 
Guide, which will need updating in light of the impending GDPR, will be referred to where 
instructive in the analysis below. 
 
iii. Safeguards in new SME credit data measures 
As noted above, ICO appeared relaxed in consultation on the SME lending reforms. At the 
Bill stage, the Commissioner did highlight the mooted obligation to share granular payment 
data as being a potential source of privacy concerns, but regrettably declined to develop that 
point any further.
126
 On the substance of safeguards for SMEs, the consensus of virtually all 
respondents whose contributions made it into the summary was that obtaining the consent of 
Page 25 of 56
https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/idpl
Manuscripts submitted to International Data Privacy Law
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
Page 26 of 56 
 
data subjects was sufficient. Government plans to ensure SMEs’ confidence in how their data 
are handled by CRAs under the new designation scheme largely relate to the extension of 
enforcement and redress mechanisms already in place for credit consumers to also cover 
“SME consumers”:
127
 the large minority of SMEs (chiefly small companies) which do not 
already count as individuals under the existing regime.
128
 In other words, in operating the 
new designation scheme for CRAs wishing to access data shared by banks the Treasury will 
not only vet potential participants for internal data protection compliance procedures before 
giving the go-ahead but will also extend the rights hitherto enjoyed only by sole traders, 
partnerships of three or fewer and unincorporated bodies to all SMEs whose data are 
processed under the scheme.  
Those SMEs will therefore enjoy the right to access their “personal” data under the DPA 
together with the notice and correction mechanism enshrined in the CCA, policed by the 
FCA.
129
 Additionally, the Regulations establish a right similar to that under the DPA for all 
such SMEs to apply to a court for an order to rectify, block, erase or destroy inaccurate data 
and “any other information which contains an expression of opinion which appears to the 
court to be based on the inaccurate information”.
130
 
This effectively creates a limited set of justiciable data protection rights for legal persons 
whereas under UK law data subject rights are enjoyed only by natural persons. Both 
theoretically and on the statute books, a strict interpretation of the concept of personal data 
would exclude such a possibility, since the entire legal regime depends on the processing of 
personal data defined by reference to “natural person[s]” and “living individual[s]” in the 
1995 Directive and the 1998 Act respectively. The exact provenance of this novel 
development, besides a general desire to reassure SMEs that their data will be handled 
responsibly and to take a common-sense uniform approach to all SMEs affected by the 
scheme, is unclear. The changes are conspicuously absent from the sections devoted to SME 
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safeguards in both the Treasury consultation paper and summary of responses, which – 
alongside standards of data quality and data security – placed the accent almost exclusively 
on ensuring that the consent of SMEs is obtained before sharing may take place. Nor do the 
Explanatory Note or Memorandum later added to the draft Regulations – which have 
themselves remained largely unchanged since December 2014 – explain this amendment. 
The changes may well reflect and complement a general will to encourage better treatment of 
SMEs by providers of financial services – and not merely ancillary actors such as CRAs. In a 
recent discussion paper, the FCA reveals that SMEs can experience bad outcomes at the 
hands of lenders in a wide range of situations due to a combination of three factors: market 
forces, market practices, and insufficient protections.
131
 The high levels of concentration in 
the market for lending to SMEs were addressed earlier. The second and third factors are 
interlinked: for example, individuals who have suffered loss as a result of authorised firms 
not complying with FCA rules have a general statutory right of action under s.138D FSMA, 
whilst generally SMEs do not.
132
 The next safety net would be a claim under the general law, 
but firms may seek to limit their potential liability through contractual terms, and those firms 
unable to negotiate beneficial terms may therefore be less likely to obtain redress through the 
courts.
133
 
To help remedy this comparative disadvantage, the 2015 Regulations also extend the 
jurisdiction of the Financial Ombudsman Scheme to all SMEs whose data are processed 
under the “designation” scheme.
134
 FCA and FOS rules are due to be changed accordingly to 
bring designated CRAs and finance platforms within the scope of the ombudsman service’s 
compulsory jurisdiction where they are not already subject to it.
135
 The shoring up in the 2015 
Regulations of data-related safeguards for “SME consumers” vis-à-vis designated CRAs 
therefore fits neatly within a general drive to level the playing field
136
 between SMEs and 
financial service providers. 
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Rights of access, redress and compensation aside, the Regulations now impose a duty on the 
FCA to monitor the proper functioning of the SME credit data sharing initiative.
137
 It remains 
to be seen precisely how such monitoring will pan out: will the emphasis be placed on 
compliance with the obligations on banks and CRAs to (respectively) share and ensure equal 
access to SME credit data? Or will the more powerful FCA also proactively monitor the 
compliance of CRAs “designated” to receive SME credit data with data protection law, 
thereby overlapping with the remit of ICO?  
Consulting market actors in June 2015 on changes to the Handbook in order to accommodate 
its new role under the Regulations, the FCA made no mention of data protection but focused 
on policing the planned sharing, further measures relating to alternative finance platforms, 
and the extension of the Financial Ombudsman Service to qualifying SMEs. The FCA located 
the rationale for reform squarely within its objectives of ensuring that the relevant markets 
function well and promoting effective competition.
138
 This document was, however, prepared 
prior to the release of the draft Regulations placing a general duty on the Authority to monitor 
banks’ and CRAs’ compliance with any requirements
139
 attached to participation in the 
scheme. We return to this point below. 
 
iv. Uncertain impact of regulation 
At the time of writing, there has been only one instance of an individual’s data protection-
related grievance against a CRA reaching trial, in Smeaton v. Equifax.
140
 Smeaton, a 
convoluted case concerning the failure of the CRA to record the rescission of a bankruptcy 
order on the plaintiff’s credit file, is also notable in that parts of the aforementioned Guide to 
Credit Scoring 2000 were cited by the Court of Appeal in support of its conclusion that 
Equifax had taken reasonable steps in order to ensure the accuracy of the data it held on Mr 
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Smeaton.
141
 Industry best practice, which Equifax had jointly created, thereby served as an 
interpretative aid in judicial proceedings against that enterprise instead of guidance of 
independent origin. Although the Court relied on the Guide in relation to a relatively minor, 
procedural point, the fact that it did so must nonetheless reflect poorly on the effectiveness of 
regulation.   
As at February 2016, there had been no enforcement notices issued, or any other action taken, 
by ICO pursuant to complaints made against the major CRAs in the UK.
142
 Responding in 
early 2014 to the Treasury’s consultation on improving access to SME credit data, ICO 
declared itself generally satisfied that “the sharing of information that currently happens 
within the market is done so in compliance with the DPA” and added that it did not see the 
DPA as posing any “barrier to widening access to SME information as long as a robust 
governance and compliance framework is in place to protect any personal data”.
143
 ICO 
monitors the strength of such frameworks through initiatives including review visits to 
organisations which process personal data, alongside the complaint and decision mechanism. 
Reporting the latest round of such visits in September 2014, examining CRAs’ compliance 
with the fourth data protection principle (data should be accurate and up-to-date),
144
 the 
regulator also appeared satisfied.
145
  
Similarly, no fines have been issued by the FCA against CRAs for violating data protection 
norms since it took over regulation of the consumer credit market in 2014. This is 
unsurprising given not only the short timeframe but also the limited nature of the data 
protection-oriented rules enshrined in the CCA 1974 as amended and CONC, detailed above, 
which the Authority is charged with enforcing. Some instances of bad business conduct or 
maladministration impacting on individual consumers have been dealt with through the 
extrajudicial Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS), but successful claims are rare and 
compensation negligible.
146
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One reason for the lack of enforcement action just detailed may be found in the complex 
terrain of the division or sharing of the regulatory burden between CRAs and other credit 
industry actors under the current UK data protection regime. Since CRAs often function 
rather like a conduit in the credit data exchange process, they may be considered the data 
controller or data processor for the purposes of data protection law. For example, where data 
captured from an individual’s economic activity (such as credit account information) is 
shared through a CRA by one of its “clients” (for instance a bank), the CRA is not the sole 
data processor since it is unable to amend that data without the client’s permission.
147
 In 
contrast, where data forwarded by the “client” is then linked to an individual by the CRA,
148
 
the CRA is the sole data controller in respect of the link – which it may unilaterally remove – 
if not of the source, which it may not unilaterally amend. 
The very fact that the regulatory burden is diffused between the numerous actors in the data 
processing environment can lead to a shifting of responsibilities to the detriment of the 
individual data subject, as the experience of ICO in monitoring data accuracy has shown.
149
 
The creation of a separate monitoring role for the FCA under the 2015 reforms may provide 
an opportunity to shore up these shortcomings: indeed, any hybrid arrangement combining 
authorisation to participate in the SME finance scheme with monitoring of data protection 
standards would bring the SME finance scheme closer to the regulatory framework in another 
EEA jurisdiction, Norway, where credit scoring is entirely governed by data protection 
law.
150
 The Datatilsynet (the Norwegian DPA) is the only authority that can grant specific 
licences to carry out credit scoring which clarify and limit inter alia the sources of data to be 
used, the different processing operations for different categories, the rules on the storage of 
information and data in specific registers.
151
  
Although it may be difficult to imagine a similar venture into the technical heart of credit 
scoring on the part of UK regulators, the Treasury reserves the right to revoke the designation 
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of a CRA taking account inter alia of the robustness of its CCA and DPA compliance 
procedures or its “compliance, and likely future compliance” with those requirements.
152
 This 
would suggest that data protection compliance is not intended as a mere one-off vetting 
exercise prior to joining the SME finance scheme but that some manner of interaction 
between the Treasury and the FCA is envisaged, although details on the  form this might take 
remain elusive.153  
At the least, a sharper enforcement focus ought to improve CRAs’ compliance with the 
limited set of data protection norms incorporated in the “designation” scheme.  From the 
overlapping consumer protection and data protection perspectives these adjustments can only 
be welcomed, and may invite reconsideration of the view that data protection “does not 
widely feature in the British regulatory context.”
154
 That was the conclusion of a recent 
comparative study on the regulation of credit scoring in five European jurisdictions, which 
also observed that “[i]n [both] Norway and the UK, the system is more open
155
 to citizens’ 
involvement; … [h]owever in Norway this involvement starts, from first principles, with data 
protection, whereas in the UK the emphasis is on making credit widely available whilst 
simultaneously educating the public about its dangers”.
156
 
It is of course an impossible task to gauge accurately the levels of compliance with data 
protection rules within the appropriate CRA context.  With this in mind, the discussion has 
thus far focused on the potential impact of the reforms underway on those levels such as they 
may be. Ultimately, however, this paper contends that the rules enshrined in the current 
regime, including those intended to ensure data accuracy, are simply inadequate to provide 
meaningful control of Big Data credit scoring developments, even given complete data 
accuracy and irrespective of which actor(s) is (are) responsible for effecting those rules. The 
comparison with Norway provides an opportunity to broaden the analysis by first underlining 
that any notion that scant enforcement action indicates overall compliance with data 
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protection norms stands in contrast to the sceptical position taken by the few independent 
experts on the relationship between credit reference agencies and data protection law. 
Ferretti, speaking with experience of working in-house at a CRA, offers the following view: 
Whether CRA activities truly comply with the law is problematic. There are critical concerns 
about the necessity, adequacy, and relevance of the type of data involved and the foundations, 
or assumptions, upon which consumer credit reporting is based to determine the predictability 
of individual human behaviours and/or the real financial capability of borrowers. 
In particular, many doubts arise as far as the legal compliance of information to be given to 
data subjects is concerned. The general objectives of transparency and informational self-
determination set by the directive seem seriously compromised by the amount and 
intelligibility of information that should be provided to individuals, the type and number of 
personal data processed by CRA[s], the indefinite number of actors involved in a spill-over 
data dissemination, and the secondary uses of the same data.
157
 
At this juncture it is worth recalling the twin objectives of data protection law: to protect the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right to privacy, 
with respect to the processing of personal data, without restricting or prohibiting the free flow 
of personal data.
158
 UK data protection regulation, in the CRA context, responds to both 
objectives by encouraging data quality and data security which ultimately contribute to the 
efficiency of the data flow. The recent ICO review visit to CRAs is a good example of this: it 
dealt only with the accuracy of data held by CRAs. Indeed, even the rights of access, 
correction and notification afforded to data subjects also serve this goal. As such, the 
“education” referred to in the IRISS study cited above seems limited to raising awareness of 
the importance of building and maintaining a credit score; for that reason, it is imperative to 
monitor and act upon any manifestly incorrect information held on one’s credit file. The 
message to the data subject is clear: CRAs are processing data ascribed to your person in 
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order to assess your creditworthiness and inform important decisions about your financial 
standing. It is up to you to ensure that that data is accurate – but you cannot know how those 
data are being used. 
Thus just as the legal framework largely declines to regulate the actual use made of personal 
data by CRAs, limiting itself to ensuring data quality, data security and so on, nowhere is it 
apparent that individuals are entitled to any measure of meaningful control – from the 
German, informational self-determination – over how their data are processed, and ultimately 
how important decisions producing a significant impact on his or her life chances are taken. 
The remainder of this contribution will therefore begin to explore potential avenues for 
increasing the involvement of data subjects, be that involvement passive or active, in such 
decision-making in light of the forthcoming EU-wide data protection reform. 
 
b. EU Data Protection Reform on the Horizon 
Finally agreed in December 2015 over three years after its first incarnation, the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) will be the first ever directly-applicable EU-wide law on data 
protection. Among its most significant substantive contributions and innovations relative to 
the 1995 Directive are inter alia a new definition of “personal data”, expanded territorial 
scope, either new or strengthened individual data subject rights, explicit regulation of 
profiling, an enshrining of “privacy by design”, greater emphasis on organisations’ 
demonstrable accountability with the provisions of the Regulation, and modified rules on 
international data transfers and so-called “Binding Corporate Rules” (BCRs). The 
enforcement landscape is also expected to be much changed from that under the indirectly-
applicable Directive, with far larger fines attached to breaches by DPAs allied to a new, 
formalised “consistency mechanism” involving the new European Data Protection Board 
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(EDPB). Recommendations of the Board, which will replace the influential if merely 
advisory Article 29 Working Party (A29WP), are to be binding and subject to appeal 
proceedings before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). From a UK 
perspective this is particularly worth underlining, since discrepancies between the UK 
implementation of the 1995 Directive, including on such elementary building blocks as the 
definition of “personal data”, will become actionable and susceptible to the Board’s 
interpretation of the text, detailed as it is at nearly 100 articles and over 100 recitals.
159
  
With this in mind and the Regulation due to enter into force in 2018, the credit reference 
industry is paying close attention. In October 2015, the Europe-wide Association of 
Consumer Credit Information Suppliers (ACCIS) reported the perspective of CRAs as 
centred on four areas of concern: legitimate interest as a ground for data processing; the 
rights to erasure and to be forgotten along with the right to object to processing; provisions on 
the processing of special categories of data; and innovative measures on profiling.
160
 The two 
latter points, featuring new configurations of legal grounds for processing with new or 
bolstered data subject rights, are dealt with below following a discussion of data subject 
consent in the credit scoring context – the only safeguard deemed necessary under the SME 
credit data scheme which we have yet to address. The fascinating questions of whether 
performing credit risk analysis constitutes a “legitimate interest” either per se
161
 or a fortiori 
in times of financial crisis,
162
 and connectedly whether emerging Big Data-informed 
techniques of calculating credit risk are definitively reliable tools for boosting such 
accuracy,
163
 meanwhile, merit a richer debate than is possible here. 
 
i. Data subject consent 
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The giving of consent by any person to any action which will produce legal effects upon that 
person is a direct expression of autonomy. Extended to the information environment, 
obtaining data subjects’ consent prior to their data being processed is intuitively central to 
ensuring informational self-determination, and has been a cornerstone of data protection law 
since its inception in the early 1970s. It continues to hold a central place in policy-making: as 
noted above, the first port of call relating to data subject safeguards of the Treasury 
consultation on sharing SME credit data was the need to obtain consent before processing. 
Yet the advent of Big Data has undeniably imperilled its status, and arguably rendered it 
next-to-obsolete in many contexts – including credit risk assessment.  
Consent is currently granted in the act of agreeing to lenders’ standard terms and conditions 
at the point of applying for a loan.
164
 Under the draft GDPR, the granting of data subject 
consent to processing of their personal data “for one or more specific purposes”
165
 exists 
alongside a range of other grounds which are each independently capable of rendering such 
processing in principle lawful, including where such processing is necessary for the 
performance of a contract to which the data subject is party (for example loan facilities) or for 
the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the data controller or a third party.
166
 
Consent may be any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication, either by a 
statement or by a clear affirmative action,
167
 and where granted in the context of a declaration 
concerning other matters (for example, the terms of a loan) must be presented in a manner 
which is clearly distinguishable from those other matters.
168
 The data subject may withdraw 
consent at any time; this must be as easy as granting consent.
169
  
How these welcome aspirations are to be reconciled in an effective manner with the reality of 
CRA activity is far from clear. First, there are internal tensions in the legislation:  on the one 
hand, consent ought to be truly informed; on the other, “[c]onsent should cover all processing 
activities carried out for the same purpose or purposes” and “[w]hen the processing has 
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multiple purposes, consent should be granted for all of the processing purposes”.
170
 Taking 
such an approach to its theoretical limits, Ferretti has pointed out that on a technical reading 
consent would thereby have to be given and renewed at a plethora of stages, not only at the 
time of making a credit application but also to the processing of each piece of data generated 
through a search on CRA databases, the fact of having secured a credit line, the fact of having 
been refused credit, and so on.
171
  
Secondly, the Regulation draws a direct link between the apparent ideal of such step-by-step 
authorisation in fleshing out its provisions qualifying consent as “freely given”: consent is 
indeed presumed not to be freely given if it does not allow separate consent to be given to 
different data processing operations despite it is appropriate [sic] in the individual case”.
172
 
Further wording intended to protect the data subject states that consent should not be 
regarded as freely given if the data subject “is unable to refuse or withdraw consent without 
detriment” or “where there is a clear imbalance between the data subject and the 
controller”.
173
 Whilst it is not difficult to point to the relative power of “SME consumer” to 
finance providers, especially in the most egregious cases of usurious payday lenders, it is 
equally possible to contend that in such contexts the impact of vitiated data subject consent 
pales into practical insignificance when compared with the arsenal of regulatory tools (FCA 
fines) already on the statute book.  
Ferretti observes that an effective right to withhold consent to the processing of personal data 
for the purposes of calculating creditworthiness would undermine the entire raison d’être of 
the credit risk industry by removing those applicants or debtors from the overall pool of 
(potential) borrowers, causing incomplete market coverage which would commensurately 
diminish the accuracy of calculations of default risk.
174
 Representatives of the credit risk 
analysis industry have also warned of the possible effects of the selective, strategic 
withdrawal of consent under the terms of the forthcoming GDPR. If an individual is able to 
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exercise her right to erasure of her personal data on the ground that the processing in question 
is not done on the basis of legitimate interests, ACCIS asserts, this will lead to an incomplete 
credit file (assuming that one would only wish to erase negative payment data, leaving the 
positive in the file) and the data subject would “join a potential group of financially excluded 
consumers who would have amended files.... [This] may make attaining credit extremely 
difficult in the future for [the data subject], and lenders would lack certainty on what has or 
hasn’t been deleted.”
175
 
In this connection it might be noted that in Norway it is possible to opt out of the entire credit 
system, thereby forgoing access to any finance at all.
176
 This unquestionably renders the 
power to give or withhold consent impactful, but what effect might it have on the 
completeness of credit data coverage? Does an opt-out mean that no score is transmitted to 
(non-existent) lenders, that no score is created at all, or that those who opt out are exempted 
from all credit risk analysis across the board? This debate raises questions of relative value of 
assets which are beyond the scope of this paper, and of a practical importance inversely 
related to the real place of consumer – or SME – credit in any given economy.  
Put simply, where consumers have no choice other than to consent to the processing of their 
personal data when applying for credit, the significance of a legal rule designed to ensure 
such consent lies principally in its ability to inform those consumers of what processing is 
actually being carried out – and vice versa: knowledge of what processing is being performed 
is the only way to preserve the integrity of consent. In other words, where credit is a rite of 
passage, as in the UK, the real value of a legal rule of consent may lie not in providing direct 
individual agency but in its indirect facilitation as a tool of transparency. Taken as such, more 
creative and didactic methods of obtaining consent might,
177
 lay the groundwork for greater 
understanding of and participation in the workings of Big Data social sorting techniques such 
as credit risk analysis. Accordingly, the following section offers initial impressions of the 
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potential impact of the most salient provisions in the GDPR aimed specifically at this type of 
phenomena. 
 
ii. Regulation of automated decision-making 
Article 15 of the 1995 Directive gives individuals the right not to be subjected to fully-
automated decisions that that have legal or (otherwise) “significant” effects on them, traces 
its origins to a pioneering 1978 French law inspired by the conviction that information 
technology “must serve mankind” and respect “human identity”.
178
 It explicitly mentions 
creditworthiness as a relevant personal aspect liable to be subject to such processing, 
alongside performance at work, reliability, and “conduct”,
179
 whilst Recital 41 to the 
Directive promises data subjects “the right to know the logic involved in the automatic 
processing of data concerning him”. Although Article 15 was, and indeed remains, an 
innovative measure
180
 prima facie it is hampered notably by cumulative conditions in the 
Directive wording and, especially in the case of the UK, implementation in national law of 
exceptions to its application sufficiently broad as to effectively neuter its impact.
181
 Taking 
the cumulative conditions in Article 15 first, for the right to apply a decision must be made, 
the decision must have legal or otherwise significant effects on the relevant person, the 
decision must be based solely on automated data processing, and the data must be intended to 
evaluate one or more of the aforementioned aspects. If the processes of credit scoring easily 
clear that last hurdle, the situation as regards the first three conditions is bereft of clarity.
182
 
Furthermore, the Data Protection Act 1998 provides that the right has no effect in relation to 
broadly-formulated “exempt decisions”.
183
 Most significantly for instant purposes, such 
decisions include those taken in the context of agreeing a contract with the data subject (for 
example, to provide finance) so long as their effect is to grant a request of the data subject 
Page 38 of 56
https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/idpl
Manuscripts submitted to International Data Privacy Law
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
Page 39 of 56 
 
(authorising the loan) or, where the request is not granted, so long as steps have been taken to 
safeguard the legitimate interests of the data subject, “for example, by allowing him to make 
representations”.
184
  
Ostensibly following OFT intervention, the industry best practice Guide to Credit Scoring 
2000 was drawn up in response. The non-binding Guide clarifies procedural points regarding 
unsuccessful applicants’ right to appeal and the stages at which credit grantors ought to 
provide a clear explanation of the type of scoring used and the principal reason(s) for the 
adverse outcome. Examples of information to be furnished to the applicant include: a decline 
based on score, a decline based on adverse CRA performance data, a decline based on other 
specific policies such as over-commitment, home ownership, age, employment status, and 
existing account performance.
185
 Although credit grantors should, upon request, provide 
details of the logic involved in the automated decision taking, the Guide clearly states that 
this is not expected to include “details of actual attributes or weightings, as it is recognised 
that this could jeopardise the integrity and/or security of the scorecards, as well as increasing 
the risk of fraud”.
186
 As hinted at by the reference to “scorecards”, the Guide has long been 
surpassed by developments in automated credit risk analysis facilitated by the SME credit 
data reforms. Although the Treasury Regulations afford the right of access to all SMEs 
affected by the credit data scheme, the right to reasons or logic behind credit decisions does 
not appear to have been considered for extension beyond those which already enjoy such a 
right as “consumers” under the existing framework: sole traders and small partnerships.  
The forthcoming GDPR, however, features a first-ever, broad definition of “profiling”
187
 and 
is set to lay the groundwork to confront this matter head-on. Its prohibition of solely 
automated decision-making is worded similarly to Article 15 of the 1995 Directive, featuring 
familiar exceptions for the performance a contract, where explicit consent is obtained, or 
where a specific law provides for it and lays down suitable measures to safeguard the data 
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subject’s rights and freedoms and legitimate interests.
188
 Notably, the oblique reference in the 
Directive to “arrangements allowing [the data subject] to put his point of view” is replaced, in 
the first two contexts (contract and consent), by “at least the right to obtain human 
intervention on the part of the controller, to express his or her point of view and to contest the 
decision”.
189
 “Meaningful information about the logic involved” in automated decision-
making is also demanded by the Regulation at various junctures with complementary 
transparency-enhancing data subject rights, such as the right to access specified information 
on processing of personal data whether it has been obtained from the data subject or from a 
third party.
190
 
Similarly to the Guide for Credit Scoring 2000 in the UK, existing approaches elsewhere 
have been outstripped by the sophistication of credit risk analysis: in the US, for example, 
“four dominant factors” must be disclosed when hundreds or even thousands of data points 
may be incorporated in models. To cite just one initiative in this connection, recent model 
legislation was drafted purporting to offer a compromise between the status quo and the 
disclosure of formulae and programming source code, “requiring all developers and users of 
credit scores and assessment tools to disclose the types of data that they collect, the sources 
of this data, and those particular data points that their models treat as significant.”
191
 Closer to 
home, in early 2014 the German Federal Court of Justice passed judgment on the petition of 
an unsuccessful applicant for car insurance under that country’s right to access provisions, 
reconfigured in 2009, in the Schufa case.
192
  Further to the standard details provided by the 
CRA, the petitioner sought “specific comparison groups it used to determine her relevant 
score values and how the individual features used […] were weighed during this process”.
193
  
The Court Access granted access to neither of these aspects of the credit scoring formula, 
deeming it liable to tip the balance envisaged by the legislation between trade secrecy and the 
transparency of scoring unduly toward the latter. The petitioner thus had to content herself 
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with access to all of her personal data stored by the defendant, information on all third parties 
granted access to that data over the preceding twelve months, current calculated probability 
values as well as data used to calculate probability values.
194
  
Such compromise solutions may well provide a useful starting point for increasing the 
transparency of scoring in other jurisdictions such as the UK. However, the concrete 
application of any lessons learned from the German litigation will depend on constructive 
partnerships with an industry which is understandably resistant to change. Commenting on 
the draft Regulation, ACCIS remarked: “it is important reasons are meaningful and useful to 
consumers; but at the same time, there are also real dangers to lenders and their customers if 
credit scoring systems are opened up to manipulation and fraud through excessive 
disclosure.”
195
 The same credit risk industry representatives maintain that credit scoring is not 
profiling, seeking thus an exemption to any of the said provisions, and stress that manual, 
human intervention would “introduce bias into the system”.
196
 
This last point is, however, not only symptomatic of an unflinching, uncritical acceptance of 
the objectivity of Big Data-powered analysis but may, by the same token, provide the single 
biggest reason to open up the Black Box,
197
 at least in the context of credit scoring. Ferretti 
may note that “[m]easures or debates over the impact of credit scoring on communities of 
colour or other protected groups, including minorities, are almost absent in the EU”,
198
 and 
there may be no evidence that confirmed difficulties in accessing finance for “diverse 
enterprises” are to any degree due to credit scoring models.
199
 All the same, a critical 
consensus is emerging in the US literature, from the vanguard of the technologies at hand: 
“Big Data claims to be neutral. It isn’t”.
200
 
In his analysis of discrimination against protected groups across the “scored society”, Zarsky 
distinguishes between explicit discrimination, implicit discrimination (through, for example, 
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masking, subconscious discriminatory motivations, and relying upon tainted datasets or tools) 
and a third outcome whereby even where all variables are removed, minorities still denied.
201
 
This is disparate impact, where despite all techniques devised to counter discrimination being 
respected “the scoring process that emerged – as a whole – proved to be a proxy for race”.
202
 
Whether such outcomes turn out to be “smoke indicating the fire of intentional 
discrimination”
203
 or indicative of any combination of internal flaws in the model, where 
detected their presence behoves legislators or regulators actively facilitating the relevant 
scoring processes to themselves innovate in order to preserve adequate levels of public-facing 
transparency. 
Credit scoring does not paint on a blank canvas, but one made up of – and indeed by – pre-
existing economic interactions. Increasingly sophisticated, automated techniques are applied 
in order to predict with a maximum degree of accuracy the risk of individuals or entities 
defaulting on credit facilities, but using datasets on historic defaults which may have in turn 
materialised on an (already) uneven playing field,
204
 and whose analytic fruits are 
subsequently folded back into the model. 
Thus, according to Pasquale, “[c]ontinuing unease about black box scoring reflects long-
standing anxiety about misapplications of natural science methods to the social realm. A civil 
engineer might use data from a thousand bridges to estimate which one might collapse; now 
financial engineers scrutinise millions of transactions to predict consumer defaults. But unlike 
the engineer, whose studies do nothing to the bridges she examines, a credit scoring system 
increases the chance of a consumer defaulting once it labels him a risk and prices a loan 
accordingly.”
205
 
To venture any further in this direction would require a discussion of the associative (rather 
than causal) and probabilistic nature of knowledge represented by profiling and an analysis of 
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the compatibility of legal and statistical concepts of discrimination and practices which far 
exceed the scope and aims of this contribution.
206
 From a data protection perspective, 
however, it remains to be noted that in addition to the provisions discussed above the GDPR 
will introduce a general prohibition on the processing of “special categories of personal data”, 
expanded from and replacing the (non-exhaustive) concept of “sensitive data” under the 
current regime.
207
  
Should any credit scoring practice, once exposed to relevant testing, be shown to operate as a 
proxy for any “special” characteristic such as racial or ethnic origin, would this “reveal” such 
a characteristic, thereby triggering the provision? As with so many aspects of the Regulation, 
the question will likely turn on the specific interpretation of its terms in the specific context at 
hand. Returning finally to that context, therefore, it ought to be cautioned that even such a 
discovery may not ultimately provide a definitive answer as to whether Big and Open Data-
equipped credit risk analysis is any more or less discriminatory than traditional techniques of 
manual intervention and judgment of character. However, notwithstanding this limitation, 
individual citizens are entitled to see all available regulatory tools harnessed in order to 
salvage some rapidly-disappearing intelligibility in pervasive social sorting practices such as 
credit scoring. Moreover, this claim would appear all the stronger where, as with the SME 
credit data reforms, publicly-funded databases such as that holding VAT Registration Data 
are being re-purposed to the most immediately tangible benefit of private actors such as 
CRAs. 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The ongoing reforms in the UK aimed at fostering more accurate credit scoring of SMEs 
represent a missed opportunity to ensure levels of protection of those SMEs’ personal data 
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which are commensurate with the privacy concerns exacerbated through the intensification of 
credit risk analysis heralded by such initiatives. This article sought to clarify the impact of the 
reforms from the perspective of the credit risk industry before contending that the associated 
regulatory re-shuffling is unlikely to significantly improve upon CRAs’ currently dubious 
levels of compliance with those principles of data protection originally intended to empower 
the data subject vis-à-vis her scorers in this fast-moving area of the information society 
whose economic importance, and thus centrality to life chances, ceaselessly grows.  
Credit is not a right, but it has become a rite of passage in the advanced economies of our 
time. If the lack of attention paid to the privacy impact of the policies in question may have 
been expected of the Treasury and HMRC given their respective overarching remits, the same 
cannot be said for data and consumer protection regulators and advocates at the domestic and 
EU levels. In this connection it is worth underlining that during their legislative passage the 
Information Commissioner’s Office had objected on privacy grounds to only one aspect of 
the SME credit data reforms: the wider sharing of granular transactional data showing 
payments in and out of SMEs’ business current accounts. However, at the time of writing, it 
now seems likely that some level of transactional data will after all be covered by the SME 
credit scheme, meaning that ICO’s objections go unarticulated.  
This is regrettable since as credit risk analysis is developed using Big and Open Data 
techniques or sources either spread, released or otherwise facilitated and encouraged by 
means of legislation, the data subject’s traditional putative footholds in data protection, such 
as the qualified rights to consent to processing, to access one’s personal data and to know the 
logic of automated processing are bound to be increasingly outstripped unless they undergo 
similar re-invention.  
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To this end, the article closed by preparing a litmus test in the shape of the most salient 
substantive provisions of the forthcoming EU General Data Protection Regulation in the 
(SME) credit scoring context, cautioning against the continued reliance on consent whilst 
welcoming the apparent shift in emphasis from protection to inclusion and empowerment 
through greater transparency, the possibility to contest a decision and the right to meaningful 
information about the logic involved in processing. For these aspirations of the next 
generation of data protection law to have practical effect, stronger, more streamlined 
enforcement of the new regime must be allied to the building of meaningful dialogue between 
data privacy lawyers and regulators, those behind the code, and those who use it.  
________ 
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